Tag: FEHA

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Employee’s Claims Under FEHA Properly Dismissed

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Employee’s Claims Under FEHA Based On Her Termination For Refusing To Get A Flu Vaccine Without A Medically Recognized Contraindication To Getting The Flu Vaccine Were Properly Dismissed

Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 2023 WL 3558767 (2023)

Deanna Hodges is a former employee of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. As a condition of her continued employment, she was required to get a flu vaccine unless she obtained a valid exemption—one establishing a medically recognized contraindication to getting the flu vaccine. Her doctor wrote a note recommending an exemption for various reasons, including her history of cancer and general allergies. None of the reasons was a medically recognized contraindication to getting the flu vaccine. Cedars denied the exemption request. Hodges still refused to get the vaccine. Cedars terminated her. Hodges sued Cedars for disability discrimination and related claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The trial court granted Cedars’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed:

  • There is no triable issue of fact as to physical disability discrimination.

Plaintiff argues her cancer history and neuropathy amount to a physical disability because they “make it impossible for her to work as she cannot work as she cannot get vaccinated. Her disabilities limited her ability to safely receive the vaccine.” To be clear, the plaintiff admits her cancer history and neuropathy in no way otherwise limited her ability to work.

By this argument, the plaintiff asserts she has a physical disability within the meaning of section 12926, subdivision (m)(1), which provides that a physiological condition that affects one or more enumerated body systems and “limits a major life activity” is a “physical disability” for purposes of FEHA. Working is expressly defined as a major life activity.

In moving for summary judgment, Cedars introduced evidence that the plaintiff was not disabled and could not prove she was disabled. It offered official guidance from the CDC and testimony from [a medical expert] that there were only two medically recognized contraindications for getting the flu vaccine. It offered testimony from the plaintiff and [plaintiff’s physician] that she had never been diagnosed with either contraindication. [Plaintiff’s physician] further acknowledged that none of the conditions he listed on her exemption form were recognized contraindications for getting the flu vaccine. If this were not enough, Cedars also offered evidence that, before she was terminated, [plaintiff’s physician] advised plaintiff to reconsider her decision not to get the vaccine and that, under CDC guidelines, plaintiff’s cancer history was not a contraindication but rather an indication—a condition making it advisable—that a person get vaccinated.

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Prospective Release Of Claims Did Not Violate Civil Code section 1668

Age discrimination and harassment are illegal.

Prospective Release Of Claims Did Not Violate Civil Code section 1668 (A Statute Providing That A Contract Releasing A Party From Future Violations Of Law Is Invalid As Against Public Policy)

Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union, 2023 WL 3515225 (2023)

Xceed Financial Credit Union employed Elizabeth Castelo as its Controller and Vice President of Accounting. In November, Xceed informed Castelo her employment would be terminated effective December 31st. On November 19, the parties entered into a Separation and General Release Agreement, in which, among other things, Xceed agreed to pay Castelo a severance payment in consideration for a full release of all claims, including a release of age discrimination claims. The Agreement also provided that, as of Castelo’s separation date, she would have to sign Exhibit “A” to the Agreement reaffirming her commitment to abide by the terms of this Agreement and effectuating a full release of claims through her December 31st separation date. The releases extended to all known and unknown claims arising directly or indirectly from Castelo’s employment. Xceed intended that Castelo would sign the reaffirmation on the date of her separation (December 31st). However, Castelo signed it on the same date she signed the main Separation Agreement, on November 19th.  Xceed did nothing to correct that error. Castelo remained employed by Xceed until December 31. In January, Xceed paid Castelo, and Castelo accepted the settlement payment. Castelo made no attempt to revoke the Separation Agreement or Reaffirmation at any time before or after receiving payment.

In August, Castelo filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The parties stipulated to arbitration. Xceed filed a motion for summary judgment based on the releases in the Separation Agreement and the Reaffirmation, and the arbitrator granted the motion. Castelo moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing a release made unlawful by Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award. The Court of Appeal affirmed:
The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Castelo signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims.

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SB 523: The Contraceptive Equity Act of 2022

Helping Employees Recover and Enforcing Employment Laws Helmer Friedman LLP.

On June 24, 2022, the radical, activist, and far-right-wing conservatives on the U.S. Supreme Court did something that even the über conservative Lochner-era Supreme Court didn’t do. The (Trump) Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito Jr. in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022), reversed a pair of cases that Justice Antonin Scalia’s acolyte, Judge Michael Luttig, had called “super stare decisis” – Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In doing so, the five radical right-wing Justices took away a fundamental constitutional right (the right to choose) for the first time in U.S. history. Perhaps most surprising about the Dobbs decision is that the right to choose was cavalierly stolen from the Country even though it was repeatedly affirmed and re-affirmed year after year for nearly 50 years in opinions written by and/or concurred in by 16 Justices – 10 different Republican Justices nominated by 5 different Republican Presidents and six Democratic Justices.

Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurring opinion, advocated for the Supreme Court to go even further toward a dystopian world straight out of The Handmaid’s Tale and reverse all of the Court’s prior substantive due process decisions, including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that the right to privacy protected against state restrictions on contraception.

Governor Gavin Newsom signs SB 523 Contraceptive Equity Act.

In response to both the horrific Dobbs decision and threats by Republicans to take away other reproductive rights Americans have taken for granted for decades, Governor Newsom signed SB 523, the Contraceptive Equity Act of 2022, into law on September 27, 2022. This law amends California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) to add “reproductive health decision-making” as a legally protected category. “Reproductive health decision-making” is defined to include, but not be limited to, “a decision to use or access a particular drug, device, product, or medical service for reproductive health.”