Category: arbitration

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Breaking Barriers: Fighting Workplace Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination in the healthcare industry.

Workplace Gender Discrimination: Know Your Rights

Gender discrimination doesn’t always announce itself. Sometimes it’s a promotion that quietly goes to someone less qualified. Other times, it’s a pattern of investigations, stripped responsibilities, and a merit raise that never materializes. Whatever form it takes, workplace gender discrimination is both illegal and deeply damaging—to the individuals who experience it and to the organizations that permit it.

The numbers tell a stark story. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), harassment complainants filed 35,774 claims in 2024—a 32% increase from 2022. Behind each of those figures is a real person whose career, livelihood, and dignity were put on the line. Understanding the legal protections available and how to act when they’re violated is not just important—it could be career-defining.

What Is Workplace Gender Discrimination?

Gender discrimination occurs when an employee is treated unfavorably because of their gender. This includes hiring decisions, pay disparities, promotions, job assignments, and terminations. It also encompasses the creation of a hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting discriminatory conduct, and the systematic undermining of an employee’s role or reputation.

Discrimination can be overt—a supervisor explicitly favoring one gender—or subtle, manifesting through patterns of exclusion, unequal scrutiny, or pretextual performance reviews. Both forms carry serious legal consequences.

The Legal Framework Protecting Employees

Several federal and state laws exist to hold discriminatory employers accountable.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII is the cornerstone of federal employment discrimination law. It prohibits employers with 15 or more employees from discriminating against workers or job applicants based on sex, including pregnancy and related conditions. Under Title VII, employers cannot refuse to hire or promote based on gender, create a hostile work environment, or retaliate against employees who assert their rights.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

Title IX prohibits gender-based discrimination in educational programs and activities that receive federal funding. For employees working within academic or educational institutions, this adds an additional layer of protection—particularly relevant in university settings where research, clinical, and teaching roles often intersect.

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)

For California workers, FEHA offers broader protections than federal law. It applies to employers with five or more employees and covers a wide range of protected characteristics, including sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, and ancestry. FEHA explicitly prohibits discriminatory hiring, promotion, and compensation decisions, as well as retaliation against employees who speak out.

A Case Study: Dr. Hindoyan v. USC, Keck School of Medicine, and Dr. Mo

No single case captures the complexity of workplace gender discrimination quite like the lawsuit filed by Dr. Antreas Hindoyan, a board-certified cardiologist, against the University of Southern California (USC), the Keck School of Medicine of USC, and Dr. Vivian Y. Mo.

Background and Allegations

According to the lawsuit, Dr. Hindoyan was once described as a “rising star” within USC’s cardiovascular division. That trajectory changed in 2019 when Dr. Mo was appointed interim chief of cardiovascular medicine and assumed supervisory control over Hindoyan’s clinical, research, and teaching activities.

Hindoyan alleges that from the outset of their professional relationship, Mo made it “unmistakably clear” that she disfavored male interventional cardiologists from the era of a former chief, Dr. Ray Matthews. The suit further alleges that the then-chair of medicine justified Mo’s appointment by stating, “USC will be proud of me, she’s a female and she’s Asian”—a comment Hindoyan interpreted as evidence that the decision was based on gender and ethnicity rather than qualifications.

Alleged Retaliation

After opposing Mo’s appointment, Hindoyan alleges a sustained campaign of retaliation. He was required to participate in a $14,000 remedial program, had his clinical duties reduced, and was denied a promised $100,000 merit raise. The suit notes that Hindoyan was subjected to three investigations in five years—a frequency no other female or non-Armenian cardiologist at USC reportedly faced.

In June 2024, Mo allegedly accused Hindoyan of doing “half-ass work” in a non-urgent patient care situation while he was off duty. His complaints about the alleged backlash, the suit states, received no meaningful response. Hindoyan was ultimately terminated—officially for poor performance, an allegation he firmly denies and considers defamatory, given that he has been forced to disclose USC’s stated reasons to family members, colleagues, credentialing bodies, and prospective employers.

USC’s Position and the Road to Trial

Attorneys for USC, Keck, and Mo have denied all allegations, including claims of whistleblower retaliation, harassment, and gender and race discrimination. The defense also argued the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and sought to resolve the dispute through arbitration.

That bid failed. In June 2026, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert Broadbelt ruled that the arbitration clause in Hindoyan’s employment agreement was “impermissibly broad” and “substantively unconscionable,” finding it to be one-sided and primarily beneficial to USC. As a result, a jury will hear Hindoyan’s claims. Trial is currently scheduled for November 2028.

The case is a pointed reminder that institutional power does not guarantee institutional accountability—and that legal protections exist precisely for situations where internal channels fail.

Recognizing and Responding to Gender Discrimination

Identifying Discriminatory Conduct

Gender discrimination rarely follows a simple script. Employees may notice they are held to different performance standards than colleagues of another gender, excluded from key meetings or opportunities, subjected to more frequent or harsher scrutiny, or denied raises and promotions without clear justification. Retaliation—being punished for reporting concerns—is its own form of unlawful conduct and one of the most common complaints filed with the EEOC.

Steps Employees Should Take

If you believe you are experiencing gender discrimination, acting promptly and strategically matters.

  • Document everything. Keep records of incidents, emails, performance reviews, and conversations. Note dates, times, and witnesses.
  • Report internally. Use your organization’s HR processes or ethics hotlines. Doing so creates a formal record and may be a prerequisite for certain legal claims.
  • Seek legal counsel. An experienced employment discrimination attorney can assess the strength of your case, identify the applicable legal framework, and advise on next steps—before critical deadlines pass.

Statutes of limitations apply to discrimination claims, meaning delays in taking action can forfeit your legal rights entirely.

Employer Responsibilities

Employers have both a legal and moral obligation to prevent and address gender discrimination. This means implementing clear anti-discrimination policies, conducting timely and impartial investigations when complaints arise, training managers on lawful conduct, and fostering a culture where employees feel safe speaking up. Failing on any of these fronts creates significant legal exposure—and, as the Hindoyan case illustrates, that exposure can be substantial.

Building a More Equitable Workplace

Gender discrimination is not simply a legal issue—it is an organizational one. When employees fear that raising concerns will cost them their careers, talent leaves, morale erodes, and institutions lose credibility. The workplaces that perform best over the long term are those that treat fairness as a structural commitment, not a reactive response to litigation.

For individuals navigating these challenges, knowing your rights is the first line of defense. For employers, building systems that uphold those rights is not just good ethics—it’s good business.

If you or someone you know has experienced workplace gender discrimination, retaliation, or wrongful termination, the attorneys at Helmer Friedman LLP are here to help. With over 20 years of experience and more than $50 million secured for clients, our team provides confidential, personalized legal advocacy. Contact us today for a free, confidential consultation.

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Prospective Release Of Claims Did Not Violate Civil Code section 1668

Age discrimination and harassment are illegal.

Prospective Release Of Claims Did Not Violate Civil Code section 1668 (A Statute Providing That A Contract Releasing A Party From Future Violations Of Law Is Invalid As Against Public Policy)

Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union, 2023 WL 3515225 (2023)

Xceed Financial Credit Union employed Elizabeth Castelo as its Controller and Vice President of Accounting. In November, Xceed informed Castelo her employment would be terminated effective December 31st. On November 19, the parties entered into a Separation and General Release Agreement, in which, among other things, Xceed agreed to pay Castelo a severance payment in consideration for a full release of all claims, including a release of age discrimination claims. The Agreement also provided that, as of Castelo’s separation date, she would have to sign Exhibit “A” to the Agreement reaffirming her commitment to abide by the terms of this Agreement and effectuating a full release of claims through her December 31st separation date. The releases extended to all known and unknown claims arising directly or indirectly from Castelo’s employment. Xceed intended that Castelo would sign the reaffirmation on the date of her separation (December 31st). However, Castelo signed it on the same date she signed the main Separation Agreement, on November 19th.  Xceed did nothing to correct that error. Castelo remained employed by Xceed until December 31. In January, Xceed paid Castelo, and Castelo accepted the settlement payment. Castelo made no attempt to revoke the Separation Agreement or Reaffirmation at any time before or after receiving payment.

In August, Castelo filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The parties stipulated to arbitration. Xceed filed a motion for summary judgment based on the releases in the Separation Agreement and the Reaffirmation, and the arbitrator granted the motion. Castelo moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing a release made unlawful by Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award. The Court of Appeal affirmed:
The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Castelo signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims.

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Employee’s PAGA Claims Not Arbitrable If Arbitration Agreement Specifically Excluded

Arbitration in Employment contracts.

Employee’s Individual, Nonrepresentative PAGA Claims Not Arbitrable Because The Parties’ Arbitration Agreement Specifically Excluded PAGA Claims From Arbitration

Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Company, 2023 WL 3717207 (2023)

Griselda Duran was employed defendant EmployBridge, LLC. As part of her employment application, plaintiff electronically signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement (1) states it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act; and (2) contains a broad agreement to arbitrate claims:

In the event there is any dispute between [Duran] and the Company relating to or arising out of the employment or the termination of [Duran], which [Duran] and the Company are unable to resolve informally through direct discussion, regardless of the kind or type of dispute, [Duran] and the Company agree to submit all such claims or disputes to be resolved by final and binding arbitration, instead of going to court, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Except as prohibited under applicable law, [Duran] and the Company expressly intend and agree that: (1) class action, collective action, and representative action procedures shall not be asserted nor will they apply, in any arbitration proceeding pursuant to this Agreement; (2) neither [Duran] nor the Company will assert any class action, collective action, or representative action claims against each other in arbitration, in any court, or otherwise; and (3) [Duran] and the Company shall only submit their own respective, individual claims in arbitration and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person.

Should any term or provision, or portion of this Agreement, be declared void or unenforceable or deemed in contravention of law, it shall be severed and/or modified by the court, and the remainder of this Agreement shall be fully enforceable.

Duran sued EmployBridge to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations suffered by her and other employees. EmployBridge moved to compel arbitration of Duran’s claims on an individual, nonrepresentative basis. The trial court denied the motion because the arbitration agreement specifically excluded PAGA claims from arbitration.

EmployBridge appealed arguing that the arbitration agreement’s exclusion of PAGA claims from arbitration did not actually mean that all PAGA claims were excluded from arbitration; rather, EmployBridge argued that individual PAGA claims had to be arbitrated. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration:

This appeal challenges the denial of a motion to compel arbitration of claims to recover civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The denial of the motion was based on the trial court’s determination that the agreement to arbitrate specifically excluded PAGA claims. We conclude the trial court correctly interpreted the agreement’s carve-out provision stating that “claims under PAGA … are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” This provision is not ambiguous. It is not objectively reasonable to interpret the phrase “claims under PAGA” to include some PAGA claims while excluding others. Thus, the carve-out provision excludes all the PAGA claims from the agreement to arbitrate.